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  Some years ago, a marshland (subsequently named Salt Lake) adjoining the city 
of Calcutta was developed by the local government and sold as small plots, at a 
subsidized price, to people who were not rich and who might not otherwise have been 
able to afford their own property. Politicians masterminding the plan worried that, unless 
some special precautions were taken, the rich would soon buy the land from the original 
owners, thereby “depriving” them of their plots. Thus, a law was announced which 
prohibited the sale of land by the original owners in Salt Lake. When I tell economists 
about this law, they usually laugh at the folly of politicians. If an owner wants to sell 
land, it must be that the owner expects to be better off by doing so; it is thus hardly a 
favor not to allow the sale. 
  However, economists do not laugh when it is pointed out that under current U.S. 
law, a firm cannot offer a job contract in which the pay is high and the benefits good -- 
but the employer reserves the right to sexually harass the worker. The fact that the worker 
who accepts this job must find the cost of sexual harassment to be less than the benefits 
associated with the job does not seem reason enough to allow such a contract. Though in 
some ways the two examples may appear similar--both involve two adults choosing to 
make an exchange that seems to have no obvious negative externality on others— most 
people perceive some crucial difference. However, when it comes to enunciating just 
what the difference is, we often make hand-waving references to how some exchanges 
are “obnoxious” or some contracts “unconscionable.”    3
This paper seeks to spell out an economic principle of why certain kinds of 
contracts, such as one where a worker is subjected to sexual harassment, may need to be 
legally banned.  I begin with some empirical context, discussing the magnitude of sexual 
harassment in the workplace and the evolution of the law. The focus will be on U.S. 
experience, since the United States has played a pioneering role in curbing workplace 
harassment and the American law has been a model to many nations that have recently 
drafted sexual harassments laws (like Bangladesh) or are in the process of drafting such a 
law (like India). I then offer a theoretical model to explain why society may desire 
legislative intervention to control sexual harassment in the workplace. It is important to 
unearth the underlying principle for such rules, since it can influence a host of labor 
market policies, such as stopping workers from being exposed to excessive health 
hazards and having statutory limits on the hours of work.  This economic approach is 
then used to critique the current law and government policy, both with regard to sexual 




  In the United States, charges of sexual harassment are usually handled under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), which went into effect in 1965, was established to enforce and 
administer this statute. 
   4
The Incidence of Sexual Harassment  
In 2001, 15,475 cases of sexual harassment were filed in the United States, shown 
in Table 1. This total combines charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission and various state and local level Fair Employment Practices Agencies. Since 
all cases that end up in the courts are filed with the EEOC or one of the state and local 
agencies, this total offers a fair measure of the number of charges that are serious enough 
to enter the legal process. The total number of sexual harassment charges rose sharply 
from 1992 to 1995, and has remained at roughly the same level since then. This was 
probably a lagged effect of the confirmation hearing of Clarence Thomas for the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which brought high visibility to issues of sexual harassment in the 
workplace, and also the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. This Act, which became 
effective in November 1991, allowed victims to claim compensatory damages for 
suffering caused by discrimination. Prior to the 1991 act, the only forms of relief 
available were “injunctive relief”—a court injunction that the discriminatory act be 
stopped—or, in the most egregious cases, that the harassee, who may have been denied 
promotion or dismissed, get back pay. 
  Table 1 also presents the number of cases “resolved” each year. (These figures 
can exceed the number of charges filed in any particular year because of overhang of 
charges from previous years.) A lack of resolution does not mean that the case did not 
have merit since many cases are closed for administrative reasons, such as failure of the 
charging party to respond to EEOC communications. Of the cases that are resolved, of 
particular interest are the “merit resolutions,” since in these cases the allegations seemed 
to have enough merit that the charges led to outcomes favorable to the charging parties.    5
  The final row of the column shows cases where the harassment may be sexual in 
nature but the basis of the harassment is not the plaintiff’s sex, but some other attribute, 
such as the person’s race or religion. Hence, in 2001, 2.5 percent of sexual harassment 
charges involved cases where the basis of harassment was not the plaintiff’s sex. 
Of course, Table 1 should not be treated as a measure of the actual incidence of 
sexual harassment in the workplace. The table does not include charges that do not reach 
the EEOC and the state and local level Fair Employment Practices Agencies, because 
they are filed and resolved within firms and corporations. Moreover, there is surely a 
large number of cases where the victim does not file charges at all. On the other hand, 
there must be some bloating of numbers caused by false charges.  
A few sector-specific studies offer some sense of the percentage of people who 
face sexual harassment in the workplace. The largest study was based on a survey of 
active-duty women in the U.S. Armed Forces in 1995. A questionnaire was sent to 49,003 
individuals and there were 28,296 returns, of which 22,372 were from women. According 
to this study, 70.9 percent of active-duty women had faced some form of sexually 
harassing behavior over the previous one year (Antecol and Cobb-Clark, 2002). This 
figure seems very high, which may reflect the special circumstances of the armed forces 
or be caused by the survey design.  
One of the largest studies from the civilian sector in the United States was 
conducted by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board  in 1980, 1987 and 1994 among 
federal employees all over the country (USMSPB, 1995). In 1994, a questionnaire was 
sent out to nearly 13,200 federal employees and about 8,000 were returned. This study 
found that 44 percent of the women employees and 19 percent of the male employees had   6
faced some form of sexual harassment in the previous two years. These numbers were 
only slightly higher than in the previous surveys. In a similar survey in 1987, 42 percent 
of women employees and 14 percent of male employees claimed to have faced some 
form of sexual harassment; still further back in a 1980 survey, the figures were 42 percent 
of women employees and 15 percent of male employees.  The study also found that only 
6 percent of those who faced harassment actually lodged a complaint (and, no doubt, 
many fewer filed a legal charge).  
Since sexual harassment is notoriously difficult to define, self-reported surveys 
like these have to be treated with caution and more work remains to be done in measuring 
the extent of sexual harassment (Welsh, 1999). For example, it is a plausible but 
unproven hypothesis that the quantity of sexual harassment in the workplace has declined 
in recent years and decades, but that an increasing awareness and empowerment of 
women workers has led to a greater percentage of cases being reported in surveys. The 
statistics we observe are a mixture of these countervailing forces. But despite the 
uncertainties that surround estimates of the extent of sexual harassment, the figures are 
sufficient to indicate that actual charges reported in Table 1 are the tip of the iceberg of 
instances of sexual harassment in the workplace.  
 
The Concept of Sexual Harassment in Law 
One reason for the different definitions is that “sexual harassment” as a legal 
concept is only about 25 years old. According to Farley (1978), the concept was 
“discovered” in 1974 in the course of discussions in a class on women and work in 
Cornell University (see also Crouch, 2001). We have come a long way since then. In the   7
years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, federal courts typically refused to 
view sexual harassment as a form of employment discrimination under the meaning of 
the statute. However, in the case of Barnes v. Costle (561 F.2d 983 [D.C. Cir. 1977]), a 
federal circuit court held that sexual remarks and solicitations, when linked to threats 
about being fired, constituted sexual harassment. Catherine MacKinnon (1979), who was 
one of the attorneys for Barnes, then published a pioneering book which argued that 
sexual harassment itself, with or without a threat of being fired, constituted employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex in the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
  In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued “Guidelines on 
Discrimination Because of Sex,” which declared sexual harassment a violation of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Along with offering some guidelines for establishing 
criteria for determining when sexual harassment has occurred, these guidelines split 
sexual harassment into two categories:  “quid pro quo” harassment, whereby a refusal to 
grant sexual favors were met with blocked promotion or frozen wages or outright 
dismissal from work; and “hostile environment” harassment, which took the form of 
sexually abusive language or gestures which made some workers feel humiliated and 
discriminated against.
1   
The courts soon followed the lead of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission. In Bundy v. Jackson in 1981 (641 F.2d 934, 942 n. 7 [D.C.Cir.1981]), a 
hostile environment alone was for the first time recognized by a federal appeals court as a 
form of harassment. In Bundy, a female employee of the Department of Corrections in  
Washington, D.C., was repeatedly invited by her supervisor to describe her sexual 
experience. When she complained about these comments to a senior manager, he took it   8
lightly, saying that the feelings of the supervisor were understandable. The court upheld 
Bundy’s charge that the innuendo and implicit threats created an intimidating and hostile 
atmosphere, and were unlawful, even though she had not suffered any tangible loss, such 
as the withholding of salary increments or promotion.
2  
In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this distinction in Vinson v. Meritor 
Bank case (477 U.S. 57 [1986]), in which Michelle Vinson, a trainee-teller, was 
repeatedly propositioned by Sidney Taylor, a vice president of the bank. After resisting 
for some time, she relented for fear of losing her job and was subjected to repeated 
unwanted sexual relations for over four years. In this case the court did not find that the 
worker had suffered in terms of pay or promotions; in fact, the court did not even find it 
necessary to decide whether a sexual relationship between worker and manager had 
happened at all. The court held that a hostile work environment alone was a violation of 
employment discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
 
A Model of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace  
 
In building a model of labor markets for analyzing sexual harassment, I want to 
motivate the exercise with a conceptual puzzle. One of the basic principles used by 
economists to guide policy decisions is the “principle of free contract,” which asserts that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 Juliano (1992) discusses the history of the “hostile environment” claim.  
2 As a digression, note that the “hostile environment” clause suggests that what constitutes sexual 
harassment may well have a cultural element to it and so may, reasonably, differ across time or across 
nations. In the United States, defendants in harassment cases have sometimes tried to use the First 
Amendment (Schauer, 2002), arguing that, for instance, Playboy posters in the workplace should be 
allowed as a form of freedom of expression. Even if we were to contest this argument, most people would 
recognize that there is a line where not all art or expression that is somehow related to sex or gender and 
that offends a single person should be grounds for a sexual harassment suit.  The point here is that different 
societies may wish to draw the line in different places.    9
when two or more consenting adults agree to a contract or an exchange that has no 
negative externalities on uninvolved individuals, then government has no reason to 
intervene and prohibit such a transaction.
3 This principle is the product of two more 
fundamental ideas: the Pareto principle and consumer sovereignty. The Pareto principle 
asserts that if a change is such that at least one party is better off and others are no worse 
off, then that change is desirable. Consumer sovereignty asserts that each (adult) 
individual is the arbiter of that individual’s own welfare.  
Now consider a case where a firm, either by virtue of its reputation for harassment 
or by writing down an explicit contract, ensures that a potential employee knows that she 
will be sexually harassed on the job. If she nevertheless accepts the job, then, by the 
principle of free contract, there seems to be no economic case for stopping such a 
contract. From this it seems a short step to argue that government should not use the law 
to stop sexual harassment in the workplace. It should be left to the individuals involved to 
be worked into the terms of employment contract appropriately. Given the heterogeneity 
among human beings, some will agree to work for lower wages but want a guarantee of 
no harassment; others may prefer higher wages, while relinquishing the right not to be 
harassed.
4   
However, I will argue that what was described as a “short step” in the above 
paragraph is deductively invalid, because there is a difference between a single contract 
or a small number of contracts of a particular kind and a large number of contracts of that 
                                                           
3 This principle has a long intellectual history and has been subjected to repeat scrutiny. John Stuart Mill 
(1848) favored this principle, though was concerned about some special cases, such as a laborer’s right to 
enter into voluntary slavery. For contemporary discussions in the context of labor markets, see Zimmerman 
(1981), Trebilcock (1993), Sunstein (2001) and Kanbur (2002).  
4 Observe that in this scheme each worker has the right not to be harassed, and in addition they have the 
right to give up that right. As Sunstein (2001) lucidly demonstrates, giving a person the right to give up a 
certain right, call it R, is not the same as not giving the right R (see also Basu, 1984).   10
same kind. The former may be morally permissible, but the latter not. Even if single 
contracts are Pareto-improving, we cannot automatically conclude that such contracts in 
general should be legally permitted. I shall call this the “large numbers argument” and 
begin by constructing a model that validates this insight.
5 The model consists of a 
straightforward adaptation of the standard demand-supply model of labor. 
 
A Model of Wages With and Without A Ban on Sexual Harassment 
Consider a market in which every firm and every worker is a price taker. I shall 
assume that employers are the potential harassers and the workers the potential harassees. 
I am therefore ruling out the problem of one worker (for instance, a supervisor) harassing 
another worker (for instance, a trainee). In reality such harassments occur, and under the 
current U.S. law the employer has “vicarious liability” and can be held responsible for 
not having taken adequate measures to prevent such harassment.  
Assume that we are in a legal regime where firms are allowed to harass workers 
as long as that possibility is made clear at the time of employment. Treating harassment 
as a zero-one concept, it is clear that at most two kinds of contracts will come to 
prevail—one where the owner retains the right to harass his workers (contract H) or one 
where the owner guarantees no harassment (contract N). Hence, at most two wages will 
come to prevail: wH for jobs with harassment and wN for jobs with no harassment Let θ 
be the amount of benefit or “perverse gratification,” measured in output units, that the 
                                                           
5 An important precursor of the large-numbers argument is Parfit’s important work (1984), where he tries to 
argue that we cannot morally evaluate a set of acts on the basis of our moral judgment about each act 
contained in the set; to think otherwise is to make a mistake in “moral mathematics” (see also Neeman, 
1999; Genicot, 2002).   11
employer gets from being able to harass an employee. Since firms are free to offer N or H 
contracts, the following condition must hold: 
   w H - θ = wN  
Note that in equilibrium, firms will be indifferent between the two kinds of contracts, 
since the gratification of harassment is just offset by the higher wage that has to be paid. I 
shall use D(wN) to denote the aggregate demand for labor by all firms when the wage 
associated with a no-harassment job is wN. 
Let us now turn to the workers. They find harassment painful; however, the extent 
of pain will differ across individuals. Measuring pain in money terms (that is, in the same 
units as wages), let us think of ci as the pain of harassment as perceived by worker i, and 
use cmax and cmin to denote the pain levels felt by, respectively, the worker who finds 
harassment the most painful and the worker who finds it the least painful. The interesting 
case occurs when   
cmax > 2 > cmin  ,        
and, in what follows, I will assume this condition holds true.  It means that there exists at 
least one worker whose pain exceeds the gratification the employer gets from harassing 
her and at least one worker whose pain is less than the gratification. This condition 
ensures that both H and N contracts will occur in the market if the law permits 
harassment contracts. That is, some workers can be persuaded to accept harassment 
contracts by virtue of the higher wage, but not all workers. This condition seems 
empirically plausible and, in the absence of more evidence, the natural assumption to use. 
  Before proceeding further, it is worthwhile commenting on some indirect 
empirical evidence which supports the assumptions of this model. Of course, there is   12
harassment in the workplace even though it is prohibited by the law. Antecol and Cobb-
Clark (2002) in their study of active-duty personnel in the U.S. found strong evidence 
that sexual harassment led to diminished job satisfaction—a fact for which there is a lot 
of evidence from studies in psychology (for instance, Schneider, Swan and Fitzgerald, 
1997). On the other hand, carefully constructed bivariate probit analysis shows that 
sexually harassing behavior does not lead to a heightened desire to quit military 
employment. While Antecol and Cobb-Clark present this finding as a bit of a puzzle, if 
the women went into this job knowing that they would face harassment, then the finding 
of diminished job satisfaction but no accompanying desire to quit the job are perfectly 
compatible, and in keeping with this theoretical model. 
  Concerning labor supply we will make the usual assumptions. Each worker’s 
labor supply, s, is an upward-sloping function of the net wage that she earns. If worker i 
chooses an N contract, the amount of labor supplied by her is given by s(wN) and if she 
chooses an H contract, the supply is s(wH – ci). Recall that though the latter worker gets a 
wage of wH, her net wage is less because she has to deduct the cost of harassment from it.  
Equilibrium in this labor market is defined in the usual way: The wage rates, wN and wH, 
associated with the N and H contracts, respectively, constitute an equilibrium if, given 
these wages, for each type of contract the demand for labor equals supply. I shall denote 
the equilibrium wages by wN* and wH*. 
  Consider next a labor market in which there is a law prohibiting sexual 
harassment (and this law is fully enforced). In such a legal regime there will be only one 
equilibrium wage, equilibrium being defined as the wage rate for which aggregate 
demand equals supply. Let me denote the equilibrium wage by w*.  What is easy to   13
prove, and of central interest here, is that the equilibrium wage, when harassment is 
illegal, will exceed the equilibrium wage, associated with a no-harassment job in a 
regime which permits harassment (Basu, 2000); in the terms of the model,  wN* < w* .  
  The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Consider the legal regime 
where no harassment is permitted and the wage is w*. Now suppose government revokes 
the law banning sexual harassment. Assume for a moment that, in this new legal regime, 
the wage that is paid for no-harassment jobs, namely, wN, happens to be equal to w*. In 
that case the total demand for labor in this new regime will be equal to the demand for 
labor in the old regime, that is, D(w*). Remember that, given wN, we know that wH will 
be equal to wN + θ and employers are indifferent between the two kinds of contracts. 
What will labor supply be in this new regime? All those who choose no-harassment 
contracts will supply the same amount of labor as in the old regime, since w* = wN. 
Consider now a person i, who chooses a harassment contract. The reason for such a 
choice must be that the wage they receive, after subtracting their personal costs of 
harassment wH – ci , exceeds wN. But this means that a person who makes such a choice 
faces a higher net wage than in the old regime. Hence, all such people will supply more 
labor than in the old regime. This means that aggregate supply of labor exceeds aggregate 
demand in the new regime. Hence, the wage wN, described above, cannot be an 
equilibrium. In particular, the equilibrium wage for no harassment jobs will have to be 
lower, so that wN* < w*. It follows from this result that all those people who take up jobs 
with no harassment guaranteed, in a regime where there is no ban on harassment, are 
better off when the economy switches over to a regime in which harassment is prohibited 
outright by the law.    14
  Indeed, it also turns out that many workers who, in a regime with no ban on 
harassment, choose jobs with harassment clauses would also prefer a regime where no 
harassment is permitted. That is, there will exist workers, who, when confronted with a 
choice between the low-wage job with no-harassment and the high-wage job with 
possible harassment, prefer the latter; that is, wH* – ci  > wN*. However, compared to both 
of these choices, they would prefer a job with the intermediate wage that would come to 
prevail in an economy where there is an outright ban on sexual harassment; that is w* > 
wH* – ci  > wN*. Thus, a ban on sexual harassment benefits those who would otherwise 
have chosen the no-harassment contract and also a number of those who would have 
chosen the harassment-allowed contract.
6 
  Hence, even if a single pair of agents entering a harassment contract is Pareto-
improving, prohibiting sexual harassment in general does not result in a state that is 
Pareto-inferior to the one that would occur in the absence of such a law, but rather 
involves a set of tradeoffs where some groups benefit and others suffer. This outcome 
does not mean that we already have a case for banning harassment, but simply that the 
case against a ban, on purely Paretian grounds, no longer exists. 
 
Moral Judgement 
  To go from here to a case for a ban one needs to combine the above positive result 
with some normative conditions. I shall argue that, once we are in the domain where 
                                                           
6 One effect of harassment that is important in reality but has been ignored here is that it reduces the 
harassed worker’s productivity. In addition, harassment can have substantial spillovers, resulting in the 
decline of productivity of the co-workers of those who are harassed. The USMSPB (1995) study estimated 
that, during 1992-94, such “group productivity losses” because of sexual harassment in the Federal 
Government alone was equal to $193.8 million. In terms of the model, this spillover amounts to another 
reason why wages associated with contracts that guarantee no harassment (in a regime in which there is no   15
alternatives cannot be ranked purely on Paretian grounds, there is a case for breaking 
away from welfarism and looking instead at what lies beneath people’s preferences.  
  We often hold views of approval or disapproval about other people’s preferences. 
Thus, we may consider a person’s preference for racism unacceptable, whereas a person’s 
preference for alcohol (though not good for his health) fine. The argument here hinges on 
distinguishing between two kinds of preferences that we consider acceptable or 
legitimate: maintainable preferences and inviolable preferences. A particular preference 
is maintainable if a person has the right to the preference, though the person may have to 
pay a price for having such a preference. On the other hand, an inviolable preference is 
something that a person has a right to have and, in addition, no one should have to pay a 
price for it (Basu, 2000, elaborates further).  For instance, a person’s preference for 
working only two days a week is a maintainable preference. No one can object to it. Of 
course, the person with that preference will be poorer and cannot expect society to make 
amends for it, but he has a right to that preference. On the other hand, the preference not 
to be sexually harassed, we can argue, is inviolable. Not only do people have a right to 
such a preference but no one should have to pay a price for having such a preference. 
What is being claimed here is that this normative evaluation of preferences should come 
into play when there is no ranking based on Paretian grounds.  
  The categorization of preferences completes the argument. If a person is forced to 
choose a low-paying job because she has a strong aversion to being sexually harassed (as 
we showed above), we may have reason to take legal action so that this does not happen. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
outright ban on harassment) may be lower and the intermediate wage that would prevail in a regime with an 
outright ban on harassment. A formal modeling of this could be worthwhile in the future.      16
What is being argued for is a blending of consequentialism and rights or, more correctly, 
the moral worth of preferences.
7 
   It is important to note that the case for banning sexual harassment is being 
justified here only partly by the suffering of those who get harassed. The model draws 
attention to all of those who do worse in the labor market when a ban on sexual 
harassment does not exist, a matter of some policy significance and one to which I return 
later.  
  Before moving on to policy matters, let me briefly address a theoretical question 
that arises from the above model: How is it possible for each single contract to be Pareto-
improving but a large set of such contracts to be not so? The way this was established 
above was by a standard competitive equilibrium argument, in which each agent is 
assumed to be a price taker. Hence one more worker signing a harassment contract is 
assumed not to affect wages, and, therefore, the welfare of other workers. On the other 
hand, when a large number of agents sign such contracts, this affects wages and, through 
that, can have an adverse effect on the welfare of other workers. Though this point is not 
always made explicit in standard economics texts, this kind of competitive equilibrium 
analysis turns out to be formally valid only in economies with an infinite number of 
agents. Is there any way of justifying this within the more realistic paradigm of a finite 
number of agents? This question, which is also one of the core concerns of Parfit’s much-
discussed work in philosophy (1984), is pursued further in Basu (2002). It is shown, for 
instance, that one way to make this “large numbers argument” formally consistent is to 
assume that human beings do not have endlessly fine perception. That is, they cannot 
                                                           
7 This line of argument is close to Sen (1982), but the particular kind of blending that is being 
recommended here is different from his.   17
distinguish between very fine differences. Such an argument is based on recognizing that 
individual preferences are typically not transitive. This seems strange at first sight 
because the assumption of transitivity is so familiar to economics. Yet it is realistic to 
assert that an individual will be indifferent between n and n+1 grains of sugar, for every 




Separating Sexual Harassment from Sex Discrimination  
 
  The economic perspective on sexual harassment legislation, developed above, 
comes with its own suggestions for the kind of law that ought to be used to control 
harassment in the workplace.  This perspective, which is generally ignored in the large 
literature and many legislative debates on workplace harassment, has a lot to offer. 
  The key to the U.S. legislation regarding sexual harassment, as discussed earlier, 
has been to view it as a form of sex discrimination in employment (Mackinnon, 1979; 
Schultz, 1998; Crouch, 2001; LeMoncheck and Sterba, 2001). This American model has 
influenced legislation worldwide; Husbands (1992) presents a comprehensive account of 
sexual harassment law in different nations.  For example, Britain’s Sex Discrimination 
Act of 1975, which closely parallels Title VII in the United States, recognizes sex 
discrimination to be unlawful and recognizes that discrimination occurs if a person treats 
a woman less favorably than he treats or would treat a man.   In India, sexual harassment 
is for the first time being recognized as unlawful. India does not have a special law 
                                                           
8 It is arguable that the notion of  “pecuniary externality,” which is germane to   18
against sexual harassment and has had to be content with the use of tort and criminal law 
to deal with the problem (Nussbaum, 2002). However, a recent writ of mandamus (a 
Court order that serves as law till formal legislation is adopted) issued by India’s 
Supreme Court in the context of a judgment in a rape case, Vishakha and Others v the 
State of Rajasthan and Others, 1997 (6 Indian Supreme Court 241 [1997]) , provides 
guidelines for controlling and punishing harassment in the workplace. This well-crafted 
writ draws on both the Indian constitution and American legislative practices, as it 
stresses the discriminatory aspect of harassment and the principle of vicarious liability 
(Haspels et al., 2001), mentioned above.  
  However, I shall argue that this tying up of sexual harassment with sex 
discrimination, though it has played an important role historically, is now becoming a 
hindrance. There should be strong laws to prevent discrimination and strong laws to 
prevent harassment. But it would be unfortunate if the only way to establish sexual 
harassment is to categorize it as a form of discrimination, because this approach raises a 
number of problems (Abrams, 1994; Hajdin, 2002). Employment discrimination by sex 
has traditionally meant men discriminating against women; for example, consider 
Farley’s (1978) definition: “Sexual harassment is best described as unsolicited 
nonreciprocal male behavior that asserts a woman’s sex role over her function as 
worker.” But sexual harassment is a more complex topic.  
  First, men’s claims of sexual harassment are increasing; from the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission data reported in Table 1, men’s claims now 
account for 13.7 percent of all sexual harassment charges, up from 9.1 percent in 1992. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
competitive equilibrium analysis, hinges on such intransitivities.   19
The coupling of sexual harassment with sex discrimination does not work neatly to 
protect people in such cases.  
  Second, in the United States  there is a significant amount of same-sex 
harassment, another situation in which law based on discrimination according to sex  
often does not provide adequate protection to sufferers -- and when it does, it is only 
because judges and lawyers interpret the law according to its likely intent rather than 
what it actually says (Talbot, 2002). According to the study by the U.S. Merit Systems 
Protection Board (1995), 21 percent of men who report being harassed were harassed by 
other men. However, in 1998 the U.S. Supreme Court cleared up some confusion in 
lower courts by ruling in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., (523 US 75 
[1998]) in a case involving a man who experienced a hostile working environment as a 
result of harassment by other men working on an oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico, that Title 
VII should be viewed as including same-sex harassment. 
  A third category which is difficult within the sex discrimination framework 
involves the problem of the boss who harasses both men and women with equal vigor and 
thus does not harass anybody because of his or her sex (Paul, 1990; Epstein, 1985).  
  A final category is those who are harassed not because of their sex, but because of 
their sexual orientation. This problem was exemplified by a case concerning Mr. Medina 
Rene, an openly gay person who worked as a butler at the MGM Grand Hotel, Las 
Vegas, and for years was harassed by co-workers. His complaint to the hotel resulted in 
no action and so he took the matter to the court. A U.S. district court ruled that Rene’s 
harassment was not based on his sex but on his sexual orientation and so was not covered 
under Title VII (Abelson, 2001). However, the ruling was overturned on September 24,   20
2002 by the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit, which ruled in Rene v. MGM 
Grand Hotel, Inc. (No. 98-16924) that Rene could bring suit (Talbot, 2002, p. 57; 
decision online at <http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov>). 
  The linkage from sexual harassment to employment discrimination law occurred 
through a set of understandable historical connections. The original sexual harassment 
cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s focused on “quid pro quo” harassment in which 
men threatened women with loss of job or reduction in pay unless the women participated 
in sexual activity. But these situations left out the issues raised by “hostile environment” 
sexual harassment. As Lipper (1992, p. 301) pointed out, in the past, “while a woman 
who had been physically assaulted, i.e. grabbed, touched or kissed, might have prevailed 
under tort theories, one who had been the object of sexual jokes would be unlikely to be 
compensated for her resulting anguish.” Such situations often had no clear injuries from 
the viewpoint of traditional employment discrimination law, and so they had historically 
been ignored and victims left without legal recourse. 
  The advantage of treating a hostile work environment as workplace discrimination 
was that it provided a pre-existing legal avenue -- to wit, laws against discrimination -- 
for addressing the problem. But once a hostile work environment has come to be 
recognized as a wrong, it is not clear why it should not be considered wrong per se, that 
is, whether or not it can be classified as workplace discrimination. Society may wish to 
have separate legal provisions for harassment that is motivated by discrimination, since 
this phenomenon is pervasive, and also because we may want to punish both the 
harassment and the discrimination. But it seems odd to confine the scope of bringing 
harassment charges only to cases where the harassment is prompted by discrimination.    21
  In an influential paper, Superson (1993) defended the connection between 
harassment and discrimination by arguing that sexual harassment should be viewed as 
“an attack on the group of all women, not just the immediate victim” (p. 49).  One 
problem with this argument is that it is not clear why an attack on one, say, black, gay, 
woman is to be viewed as an attack on all women, and not all blacks, all gays, or, for that 
matter, all moral beings? A second problem is that sexual harassment may not always 
arise from a feeling that the victim is inferior, as this argument suggests. It seems more 
sensible to categorize harassment by the effect on the harassee, no matter what motivates 
the harasser. However, in Superson’s emphasis on discussion of social mechanisms 
whereby one person’s victimization affects others, her argument is very much in the spirit 
of this paper, which emphasize how such effects can spread through the workings of the 
market.  
  Indeed, the economic model of sexual harassment presented here suggests that 
even if a harassment-allowing contract was freely accepted by both sides, society would 
have reason to ban harassment because of the costs that it imposes on those who choose 
the no-harassment contract.  This economic approach suggests that the existing 
interpretation of sexual harassment may not be going far enough. The existing legal 
provisions are not cognizant of the losses of those who are not harassed because they may 
have taken otherwise-inferior jobs, where there is the assurance of no harassment, or have 
remained unemployed. Such workers cannot seek compensation under existing sexual 
harassment laws, because they are not harassed physically or even environmentally. But 
they nevertheless pay a price.  Hence, perhaps surprisingly, the economic approach takes 
us to a more widespread interpretation of what constitutes the harm of sexual harassment.    22
  Finally, it is worth noting that in the above model it was assumed that sexual 
harassment is well-defined and can be the subject of enforceable contracts. It is possible, 
however, to argue that it is difficult to write contracts about harassment, and try to 
construct an argument for a legal ban based on this difficulty. While this is a line that 
needs to be explored, one must not prejudge its conclusions. Even if complex contracts 
are not possible, it is often possible to write simple contracts, such as, “I relinquish all 
rights that I have under Title VII.” If the rights under Title VII are meaningful, then 
relinquishing those rights must be meaningful.  Hence, in principle, it is possible to grant 
individuals the right to give up those rights.  But the fact that people may want to use 
more nuanced contracts about what workplace conduct is acceptable, which in turn may 
be harder to monitor and enforce, does lead to open questions deserving future 
investigation. 
 
Reflections on Labor Standards and Rights  
 
  The approach to analyzing sexual harassment in this paper provides an instrument 
for analyzing other kinds of labor market problems, such as occupational safety, child 
labor, and labor rights and standards in general. In all of these cases, it is possible to 
compare an across-the-board government regulation with a market in which workers sort 
themselves into different jobs according to their preferred combinations of pay and work 
environment.  
  Consider the problem of hazardous jobs. Should workers be allowed to opt for 
such jobs, on the argument that some workers may find poverty more grueling than the   23
pain of such a job?  In answering or examining this question, the focus is invariably on 
the workers who take up such jobs; for instance, Cohen’s (1987) thought-provoking 
paper on this subject has this focus. I am arguing that in considering the general question 
of whether such jobs should be allowed or whether firms should be compelled by law to 
take safety measures, a crucial constituency is not the workers who currently have such 
jobs, but those, especially poor workers, who do not. Moreover, one needs to consider the 
constituency of those who will choose a high-wage hazardous job over a low-wage safe 
job, but who would prefer a medium-wage safe job.
9 
  Of course, the arguments presented here should not be taken as a defense of all 
labor market interventions. One hugely contentious debate on labor market policy in 
recent times concerns international labor standards (for instance, Bhagwati, 1995; 
Krueger, 1997; Basu, 2001; Engerman, 2001; Satz, 2003). Is there reason for 
international authorities to try to enforce certain minimal standards in labor markets, such 
as prohibiting child labor, or stopping workers from doing hazardous work, or imposing a 
minimum wage, or allowing workers to unionize? On some of these matters we may 
reach a straightforward conclusion on the basis of the standard externality or multiple 
                                                           
9  In certain situations, it is possible to have an equilibrium in which firms offer only one kind of contract, 
where individuals have to relinquish the right not to be harassed, and the worker may take it or leave it. 
This gives rise to some interesting philosophical questions concerning the moral status of “standard form” 
contracts that many large and powerful enterprises use. Wertheimer (1996, Chapter 2, pp. 45-6) discusses 
this problem in the context of Henningsen v. Bloomfield, (32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), in which Mrs. 
Henningsen, who was injured while driving her newly purchased Plymouth car, sued for damages, whereas 
Bloomfield Motors and Chrysler argued that by signing the standard purchase order, Mr. Henningsen, her 
husband, had absolved Bloomfield Motors and Chrysler of any responsibility. The question was whether by 
signing beneath the fine print of the standard form he could be described as having got into the contract 
voluntarily. It seems arguable and the New Jersey Supreme Court did indeed take the line that “freedom of 
contract” applies most clearly to contracts that are the result of “free bargaining of parties” rather than the 
standardized mass contracts used by enterprises with strong bargaining power.  What Wertheimer does not 
discuss is another dimension to this problem which arises from the fact (to which we have been alerted by 
the new behavioral economics) that human choice is highly dependant on what is presented as the default 
option. Workers can be made to contradict their own choice by altering what is presented as the standard 
form.   24
equilibria arguments. For example, in the case of child labor, Basu (1999) argues that 
there are two possible equilibria, a low-wage equilibrium with child labor and a 
preferable high-wage equilibrium where children attend school, and so, if an economy 
happens to be caught in the less-desirable equilibrium, a natural case arises for 
prohibiting the behavior that occurs in that equilibrium so that the economy is deflected 
to the other equilibrium. But there are cases where there may not be more than one 
equilibrium and the externality principle may not work, at least not without stretching the 
principle beyond recognition. In such cases, it will be worthwhile trying to apply the 
large-numbers argument along with the normative criterion discussed above. 
  As a particular example, consider what may be called the “maquiladora 
dilemma.”  A maquiladora or an export-processing zone is an area often on the border of 
a country where goods are often imported, processed in some way, and then shipped back 
across the border, free of export duties. In some countries, if a worker wants to work in a 
maquiladora, that worker is required to give up certain labor rights that are guaranteed in 
all other sectors of the economy. Many labor rights advocates argue against such 
exemptions (ILO, 2000; and the proceedings of an ILO meeting at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/bangkok/download/epz.pdf ). However, if   
a worker chooses to give up certain rights in order to work in an export-processing zone, 
it must be because the worker expects to be better off by doing so. On standard Paretian 
grounds, there seems to be no reason to stop a worker from making such a choice.  
  The only way to justify such an intervention is to check where the large-numbers 
argument takes us. That is, find out how the existence of such export-processing zones 
may affect the wages and work conditions of those who do not work in the zones, and if   25
some of those who work in the zones prefer that the zones be outlawed.  It seems clear 
that the spillovers of sexual harassment reduce the welfare of other workers who may not 
be direct victims, but it is an open question how the spillovers from export-processing 
zones affect workers who are not in those zones. Finally, the argument that it is unfair to 
force workers who prefer not to be sexually harassed into low-wage jobs has considerable 
moral force; the corresponding argument that it is unfair to force workers who prefer that, 
say, their job be guaranteed by the government to last in perpetuity into lower-wage jobs 
has somewhat less moral force. Of course, listing these arguments does not settle the 
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Table 1 
Sexual Harassment Charges Filed with Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission and Fair Employment Practice Agencies, 1992-2001 
 
 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
                     
Total Charges  10,532 11.908 14,420 15,549 15,342 15,889 15,618 15,222 15,836 15,475 
Charges Filed 
By Men (%)  
9.1  9.1  9.9  9.9 10.0 11.6 12.9 12.1 13.6 13.7 
Resolutions  7,484  9,971 11,478 13,802 15,861 17,333 17,115 16,524 16,726 16,383 
Merit 
Resolutions 
2,019 2,524 2,713 2,709 2,882 3,253 3,576 3,840 4,724 4,768 
Total Charges 
Where the 
Basis was the 
Person’s Sex 
(% of Total 
Charges) 
96.7 96.6 97.6 96.9 97.4 97.1 97.1 97.0 97.1 97.5 
 
 
Source: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, National Data Base. 